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I. INTRODUCTION
The phrase “Tax Constitutional Questions” may seem to be an oxymoron
or at least an interesting juxtaposition somewhat akin to the phrase “passive
activity” derived from Section 469 of the Internal Revenue Code, which is
familiar to tax practitioners, professors, and perhaps others.1 It has been
noted elsewhere that it is seemingly normal that tax professors (and tax
practitioners) are somewhat isolated from such weighty issues as

* Honors A.B., Xavier University, J.D., Case Western Reserve University, LL.M. (Tax), University
of Florida, C.P.A., California and Ohio, is a Professor of Accounting at California State University, San
Bernardino. Thank you to my wife, Tanya, who constantly inspires me, our dog Murphy, who constantly
entertains me, and our sons Jonathan and Garrett, who constantly interest me. Thank you also to Kathi
Menard who has taken on the task, from the now retired Marion Wiltjer, of trying to decipher my dictation
and handwriting.
1. I.R.C. § 469 (2012).
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constitutional questions.2 Professor Erik Jensen has stated, “[T]hat issues of
race, gender, and class have not been addressed very much by tax professors,
who have instead ‘focused on more narrow and technical issues in business
and financial taxation.’”3 Professor Jensen has also emphasized the “tax
academy’s traditional insistence on connection with the real world of
practice” and the often separation of tax and constitutional questions (“[b]ut
raise one tax question with a con law person, and he’s gone . . . .”).4
Despite what may be the tax bar’s seeming reluctance to engage in
constitutional questions, those questions are nevertheless thrust upon tax
practitioners and professors. Perhaps nowhere has the intersection of
taxation and constitutional law been clearer than in the recent United States
Supreme Court case on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (hereinafter
“NFIB”).5 In fact, Chief Justice Roberts’s five-four majority opinion upheld
the so-called individual and employer mandate of the legislation, dubbed
“Obamacare,” as a tax.6 Much has been and will undoubtedly be written
about NFIB. The attempt here will be to determine whether or not some of
the other recent tax constitutional cases, particularly Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission,7 which might be used in a tax setting, shed
any light on the constitutional decision making in NFIB.8 Once again, this
task is approached from the perspective of the tax professor and practitioner
rather than those in the field of constitutional law. Indeed, in Citizens
United, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, was relying heavily upon a
tax constitutional case, despite not specifically citing to the case.9 In Citizens
United, Justice Kennedy quotes Justice Scalia’s dissent in Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce writing, “It is rudimentary that the State cannot exact
as the price of these special advantages [of the corporate form] the forfeiture
2. John R. Dorocak, Same-Sex Couples and the Tax Law: Tax Filing Status for Lesbians and Others,
33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 19, 20 at n.4 (2007) and accompanying text (citing Erik M. Jensen, Critical Theory
and The Loneliness of The Tax Prof, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1753, 1766 & n.17 (1998)); see also John R.
Dorocak, The Income Tax Exclusion of the Housing Allowance for Ministers of the Gospel per I.R.C.
Section 107: First Amendment Establishment of Religion or Free Exercise Thereof-Where Should the
Warren Court Have Gone?, 54 S.D. L. REV. 233, 236 at n.10 (2009); John R. Dorocak, Recent
Constitutional Questions in Taxation: Toward a Legislative Solution to Constitutional Problems of SameSex Couples and Ministers of the Gospel?, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 223, 224 at n.2 (2009);
John R. Dorocak & Lloyd E. Peake, Political Activity of Tax-Exempt Churches, Particularly After Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission and California’s Proposition 8 Ban on Same-Sex Marriage:
Render Unto Caesar What is Caesar, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 448, 480 & n.152 (2010).
3. Jensen, supra note 2, at n.17 and accompanying text (citing Edward McCaffery, Statement at
Taxation and the Family Conference at Lewis and Clark Northwestern School of Law (Oct. 6, 1995)
(quoted in Rebecca S. Rudnick, Taxation and the Family, 69 TAX NOTES 421, 421 (1995)).
4. Id. at 1753, 1756.
5. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (hereinafter “NFIB”).
6. Id. at 2608.
7. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
8. See generally Dorocak & Peake, supra note 2.
9. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905 (1990) (quoting Austin v. Mich.
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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of the First Amendment rights.”10 The tax constitutional case citation that
Justice Kennedy omitted from Justice Scalia’s quote was Speiser v.
Randall.11
The inquiry here is whether or not Speiser’s prohibition of the
nonexercise of a constitutional right as a condition for a tax benefit might
also apply to, or at least inform, the constitutional decision making in NFIB.
This article will first review the reasoning concerning the use of the taxing
power to sustain legislation before the court in both the majority and
dissenting opinions in NFIB. Second, this article will discuss the cases of
Speiser and Citizens United within the context of tax constitutional cases.
Third, this article will discuss whether Speiser and Citizens United might
apply to or inform the decision making in NFIB. Fourth, this article will
discuss similarities and differences in the use of Speiser, in context of matters
to which Citizens United would apply in the tax area and the context of
NFIB. Finally, the last section of this article will extend to the broader areas
of constitutionalism in an effort to understand NFIB in the light of Speiser.
That is, the constitution as a charter of negative or positive liberties will be
discussed.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO TAX IN NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
INDEPENDENT BUSINESS
In NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the five-four majority of the
Court, upheld a provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
the so-called individual mandate to purchase health insurance or to make a
payment to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), as an exercise of the taxing
power to “lay and correct Taxes,” as established in Article 1, Section 8,
Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution.12 In closing, the portion of the Court’s
opinion upholding the individual mandate as a tax, Chief Justice Roberts’
states, “The Affordable Care Act’s requirement that certain individuals pay a
financial penalty for not obtaining health insurance may reasonably be
characterized as a tax. Because the Constitution permits such a tax, it is not
our role to forbid it, or pass upon its wisdom or fairness.”13
Chief Justice Roberts’s first reason—that the individual mandate’s
“shared responsibility payment” is a tax—is because “it looks like a tax” for
multiple reasons.14 First, the payment is made to the Treasury by taxpayers
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 905.
Austin, 494 U.S. at 680.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600.
Id.
Id. at 2594.
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when they file their tax return and does not apply to individuals who do not
pay federal income taxes because their income is below the filing threshold.15
Second, the amount to be paid is determined by factors such as income,
number of dependents, and joint filing status.16 Third, the amount to be paid
is enforced by the IRS in the same manner as taxes.17 Fourth, the payments
produce revenue, estimated to be about $4 billion by 2017.18
In addition, Chief Justice Roberts states that the Court has, in several
previous cases, held that the label Congress uses, tax or penalty, does not
control for constitutional purposes.19 Chief Justice Roberts cites Bailey v.
Drexel Furniture, License Tax Cases, and New York v. United States to
support the assertion that the Congressional label is not controlling for
constitutional purposes.20 He then applied the three-part reasoning used in
Drexel Furniture to conclude that the fee in the case at hand was a tax. First,
Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that the required payment would be far less
than the price of insurance, and it would be a reasonable financial decision to
make the payment unlike the “prohibitory” payment required in Drexel
Furniture.21 Second, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that the individual
mandate had no scienter requirement, the requirement typical of punitive
statutes requiring that the act be done knowingly.22 Third, the Chief Justice
reasoned that the payment was collected by the IRS, the normal agency for
collecting taxation, rather than another agency.23
Further, Chief Justice Roberts compared the payments under the
Affordable Care Act to the payment required in New York, in which a state
responsible for providing for disposal of low-level radioactive waste was
exposed to a surcharge if it shipped such waste to another state.24 Chief
Justice Roberts stated that the Court had interpreted the statute in New York
as a tax imposing “a series of incentives” encouraging a statute to take
responsibility for its nuclear waste.25 Chief Justice Roberts stated that a
“similar approach” would apply in NFIB.26
Chief Justice Roberts indicated that there were three considerations
limiting the extent of imposing a tax for “not doing something.”27 First, he
reasoned that Congress already had exercised its taxing power to encourage
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2595 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,
259 U.S. 20 (1922); License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462 (1867)).
21. Id. at 2595–96.
22. Id. at 2596.
23. Id.
24. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2597.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2599.
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activity such as purchasing homes and professional education so that
upholding the mandate of the purchase of health insurance “does not
recognize any new federal power.”28 Second, the Chief Justice reasoned that
the taxing power was limited in that a measure such as the shared
responsibility payment must “pass muster as a tax under our narrower
interpretation” and that there also was a “point at which an exaction becomes
so punitive that the taxing power does not authorize it.”29 Writing for the
majority, the Chief Justice held that the shared responsibility payment met
the three-part test of what was a tax under Drexel Furniture.30 Third, the
Chief Justice stated that the power to tax, although broader than the power to
regulate commerce, “does not give Congress the same degree of control over
individual behavior” because “Congress’s authority under the taxing power is
limited to requiring an individual to pay money into the Federal Treasury, no
more.”31
The joint dissent, with whom Chief Justice Roberts agreed on the holding
that the individual mandate could not be constitutionally sustained as an
exercise of the commerce clause,32 would have also held that the individual
mandate could not be constitutionally justified as an exercise of the taxing
power.33 In its analysis that the commerce clause could not be used to
constitutionally justify the individual mandate, the joint dissent suggested
that “there are many ways other than this unprecedented Individual Mandate
by which the regulatory scheme’s goals of reducing insurance premiums and
ensuring the profitability of insurers could be achieved.”34 The dissent then
advised that those who did not purchase the insurance could be surcharged
when they entered the health care system or those individuals could be
denied a full income tax credit given to others who purchased insurance.35
The dissent stated that “[t]he issue is not whether Congress had the power to
frame the minimum-coverage provision as a tax, but whether it did so.”36
In a lengthy decision of the Court involving several opinions, the joint
dissent devotes just a few pages to its reasoning that the individual mandate
was not sustainable as an exercise of the taxing power.37 The joint dissent
states that Congress did not exercise the taxing power and the dissenters

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2599.
Id. at 2600.
Id. at 2593.
Id. at 2655 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., and Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2647.
Id.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2651.
Id.at 2650–55.
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refused to rewrite the statute to exercise that power.38 The joint dissenters
explained their reasoning as follows:
Our cases establish a clear line between a tax and a
penalty . . . . In a few cases, this Court has held that a “tax”
imposed upon private conduct was so onerous as to be in
effect a penalty. But we have never held—never—that a
penalty imposed for violation of the law was so trivial as to
be in effect a tax.39
The dissent found that the individual mandate in Section 5000A of the
Internal Revenue Code imposed a penalty for failure to meet a requirement
and that the congressional legislative findings with regard to the section
“confirm that it sets forth a legal requirement and constitutes the assertion of
regulatory power, not mere taxing power.”40 In addition, the dissent stated,
“We never have classified as a tax an exaction imposed for violation of the
law, and so too, we never have classified as a tax an exaction described in the
legislation itself as a penalty.”41 Further, the dissent pointed out that there
were two classes of those exempt from Section 5000A: those exempt from
the mandate because such persons were not “an applicable individual”—
those with religious objections, not lawfully present in the U.S., or
incarcerated—and those exempt from the payment liability—those who
could not afford coverage, earned too little income, or members of an Indian
tribe, who have short gaps in coverage, and who have suffered hardship in
the judgment of the Secretary of Health and Human Services.42 The dissent
stated that if the payment were a tax, there would be only one category of
exemptions; i.e., those exempt from the tax.43
Additionally, the dissent also indicated that the Court had found the IRS
could collect a penalty, but that, where other agencies were involved, this
was “a feature that would be quite extraordinary for taxes.”44 Finally, the
dissent stated, “And the nail in the coffin is that the mandate and penalty are
located in Title I of the Act, its operative core, rather than where a tax would
be found – in Title IX, containing the Act’s ‘Revenue Provisions.’”45 The
dissent added:

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 2651.
Id.
Id. at 2652.
Id. at 2653.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2653.
Id.
Id. at 2654.
Id. at 2655.
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We have no doubt that Congress knew precisely what it was
doing when it rejected an earlier version of this legislation
that imposed a tax instead of a requirement-with-penalty
. . . . Imposing a tax through judicial legislation inverts the
constitutional scheme, and places the power to tax in the
branch of government least accountable to the citizenry.46
In closing, the dissent observed that “rewriting § 5000A as a tax in order
to sustain its constitutionality would force us to confront a difficult
constitutional question: whether this is a direct tax . . . [N]o federal court has
accepted the implausible argument that § 5000A is an exercise of the taxing
power.”47
III. SPEISER V. RANDALL AND CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC: CONDITIONING A
BENEFIT ON THE NONEXERCISE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
In NFIB, the five-four majority and the dissent reach opposite
conclusions on the issue of whether the required payment of the individual
mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is a
constitutionally permissible tax.48 In light of the division in the court,
perhaps precedents of the Court other than those examined by the majority
and the dissent might assist in resolving the constitutional question of
whether the required payment is a constitutional exercise of the taxing
power. The suggestion here is to look to a recent precedent of the Court,
Citizens United, and related cases.49 Although the much analyzed and often
criticized doctrine of constitutional conditions might be said to be involved,
the suggestion is to examine the recent case in possibly a new light.50
In Speiser, Justice Brennan famously wrote, “[W]e hold that when the
constitutional right to speak is sought to be deterred by a State’s general
taxing program due process demands that the speech be unencumbered until
the State comes forward with sufficient proof to justify its inhibition.”51
Justice Brennan added, “Similarly it does not follow that because only a tax
liability is here involved, the ordinary tax assessment procedures are
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566.
49. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (1990).
50. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein Judicial Engagement With the Affordable Care Act: Why Rational
Basis Analysis Falls Short, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 931, 933–34 (2012) (lamenting the decline of the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions); Note, What The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Can Teach
Us About ERISA Preemption: Is It Possible to Consistently Identify “Coercive” Pay-or-Play Schemes?,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1482 (2009) (citing much of the existing scholarship).
51. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528–29 (1958).

196

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 11, No. 2

adequate when applied to penalized speech.”52 In Speiser, the taxpayer was
required to take a loyalty oath to obtain a property tax exemption available to
veterans.
Justice Scalia, when utilizing Speiser in his dissent in Austin, stated
perhaps more directly, “It is rudimentary that the State cannot exact the price
of those special advantages the forfeiture of First Amendment rights.”53
Justice Scalia had “[t]axbreaks” listed among the “all sorts of special
advantages that the State need not confer.”54 Scalia’s dissent in Austin
became the basis of the majority opinion in Citizens United, in which Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, overruled Austin and adopted, by citation
and quotation, Scalia’s dissenting language in Austin, although not Scalia’s
citation to Speiser.55
Plainly, Speiser and Citizens United involved the First Amendment right
of free speech and it was in that context that the Justices of the Supreme
Court stated that a tax benefit could not be conditioned upon the non-exercise
of a constitutional right. But perhaps that principal has a broader application.
In Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington,56 Justice
Blackmun, in the concurring opinion joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, placed Speiser in a wider context:
If viewed in isolation, the lobbying restriction contained
in § 501(c)(3) violates the principal, reaffirmed today, “that
the government may not deny a benefit to a person because
he exercises a constitutional right.” Section 501(c)(3) does
not merely deny a subsidy for lobbying activities; it deprives
an otherwise eligible organization of its tax-exempt status
. . . for all its activities[.]57
The majority opinion in Regan, perhaps more forcefully than in Speiser,
stated that “TWR is certainly correct when it states that we have held that the
government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a
constitutional right.”58

52. Id. at 525.
53. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)).
54. Id.
55. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905 (2010); Dorocak & Peake, supra
note 2, 469 at n.102 and accompanying text.
56. 461 U.S. 540, 552 (1997).
57. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 552 (1997) (citing Speiser, 357
U.S. at 518–519) (citations omitted); Dorocak & Peake, supra note 2, at n.41 and accompanying text.
Justice Brennan appears to be stating the difference in The Constitutional Conditions doctrine of denying a
subsidy versus imposing a penalty. See Note, supra note 50, at 1511.
58. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545.
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The Regan majority cited yet another case, Perry v. Sindermann, in
which Justice Steward was likely even more direct in stating the principle.
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear
that even though a person has no “right” to a valuable
governmental benefit and even though the government may
deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are
some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It
may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes
his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest
in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a
benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected
speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would
in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the
government to “produce a result which [it] could not
command directly.” Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526.
Such
interference
with
constitutional
rights
is
impermissible.59
IV. DO SPEISER AND CITIZENS UNITED AID IN UNDERSTANDING NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS?
A. Liberty as the Non-Exercised or Burdened Constitutional Right
Thus the Supreme Court has acknowledged, apparently frequently, that a
benefit, including a tax benefit, may not be conditioned on the non-exercise
of a constitutional right, or, in other words, that the constitutional right may
not be burdened. Applying this reasoning in NFIB would likely immediately
raise the question of what constitutional right was burdened or not exercised
in order to obtain the tax benefit of not being forced to make the required
payment of the individual mandate. Perhaps the constitutional right, which is
not exercised or is burdened, might be found in an examination of the key
difference between the majority opinion and the dissent, at least in terms of
examples about taxes.
Chief Justice Roberts, in the majority opinion, cites the following
example:
Suppose Congress enacted a statute providing that every
taxpayer who owns a house without energy efficient
59. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
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windows must pay $50 to the IRS. The amount due is
adjusted based on factors such as taxable income and joint
filing status, and is paid along with the taxpayer’s income
tax return. Those whose income is below the filing threshold
need not pay. The required payment is not called a “tax,” a
“penalty,” or anything else. No one would doubt that this
law imposed a tax, and was within Congress’ power to tax.60
On the other hand, the dissenters clearly did not believe Chief Justice
Roberts’ example was a tax. The dissenters’ examples differed:
With the present statute, by contrast, there are many
ways other than this unprecedented Individual Mandate by
which the regulatory scheme’s goals of reducing insurance
premiums and ensuring the profitability of insurers could be
achieved. For instance, those who did not purchase
insurance could be subjected to a surcharge when they do
enter the health insurance system. Or they could be denied a
full income tax credit given to those who do purchase the
insurance.61
Clearly the dissent’s two examples highlight the dissenters’ refusal to extend
the commerce clause to inactivity and the taxing power to a penalty.
The dissent, in its examples, was concerned about the extent of federal
government power and the protection of individual constitutional rights.
The Government was invited, at oral argument, to
suggest what federal controls over private conduct (other
than those explicitly prohibited by the Bill of Rights or other
constitutional controls) could not be justified as necessary
and proper for carrying out of a general regulatory scheme.
It was unable to name any . . . . [T]he proposition that the
Federal Government cannot do everything is a fundament
precept.62
Thus, given these tax examples of the majority opinion and the dissent,
and the dissent’s reference to private conduct, the question of what
constitutional rights are not exercised to avoid the required payment under
the individual mandate is again raised. Or, in other words, what
constitutional right is burdened by that payment?
60. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2597–98 (2012).
61. Id. at 2647.
62. Id. (citation omitted).
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The first answer that may occur to outsiders—such as tax practitioners,
tax professors, possibly constitution scholars, those on the court, those in
academia and others—is that liberty is what is protected. However,
protecting liberty under current constitutional jurisprudence may not be such
an easy matter. In criticizing the current jurisprudence, which protects
liberty under the due process clause, Professor Randy Barnett has said the
following:
There are two different formulations of what makes a liberty
fundamental, and sometimes courts run them both together:
those rights that are “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty” and those rights that are “deeply rooted in the
nation’s tradition and history.”
....
The fact that courts can come out any way they want,
depending on which of the accurate characterizations of the
liberty they choose shows that there is something seriously
wrong with current doctrine.63
This difficulty in protecting liberty apparently exists despite the
statement in the Preamble to the Constitution that it was drafted to “secure
the Blessing of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity . . .”64 and the famous
wording of the Declaration of Independence, “[T]hat all men . . . are
endowed, by their Creator, with certain unalienable rights; that among these
are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness . . . .”65
Without using the term “liberty” itself, Justice Scalia still wrote
forcefully for the dissent in NFIB as follows:
What is absolutely clear, affirmed by the text of the 1789
Constitution, by the Tenth Amendment ratified in 1791, and
by innumerable cases of ours in the 220 years since, is that
there are structural limits upon federal power—upon what it
can prescribe with respect to private conduct, and upon what
it can impose upon the sovereign States. Whatever may be
63. Randy E. Barnett, Access to Justice: The Social Responsibility of Lawyers: The Presumption of
Liberty and the Public Interest: Medical Marijuana and Fundamental Rights, 22 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y.
29, 41, 43 (2006) [hereinafter The Presumption of Liberty].
64. U.S. CONST. Pmbl.
65. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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the conceptual limits upon the Commerce Clause and upon
the power to tax and spend, they cannot be such as will
enable the Federal Government to regulate all private
conduct and to compel the States to function as
administrators of federal programs.66
However, whether the formulation is that the federal government has
limited powers, or that individuals have liberty, is this argument not the
same? Professor Barnett counseled that the limited powers argument could
more easily find a receptive audience, particularly on the Court, stating. “I
think there may be five votes for the proposition that economic mandates are
simply not within the limited and enumerated powers of Congress.”67
B. Supreme Court Precedents on Liberty—Griswold v. Connecticut,
Eisenstadt v. Baird, Roe v. Wade, Lawrence v. Texas
Likely, anyone even slightly familiar with the Supreme Court’s
protection of liberty under the due process clause would turn to cases such as
Griswold v. Connecticut,68 Eisenstadt v. Baird,69 Roe v. Wade,70 and
Lawrence v. Texas,71 as does Professor Barnett.
While there is no need to memorize the lost Ninth
Amendment, law students really should memorize Footnote
Four [United States v. Carolene Products] because, to some
degree, this Footnote became the sole constitutional
protection of liberty. In the body of the opinion in Carolene
Products, the court adopts a “presumption of
constitutionality” that attaches to any legislation—especially
that which purports to regulate the economy. Footnote Four
then qualifies the text by asserting that there is a narrower
scope for the operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when the laws affect the rights or specific
prohibitions of the Constitution—including portions of the
Bill of Rights.
....
66. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2643 (2012).
67. Brad Joondeph et al., Our Pending National Debate: Is Health Care Reform Constitutional?, 62
MERCER L. REV. 605, 617 (2011).
68. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see John R. Dorocak, Same-Sex Couples and the Tax Law: Tax Filing Status
for Lesbians and Others, 33 OHIO N. UNIV. L. REV. 19, 29–31 (2007).
69. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
70. 410 U.S. 438 (1973).
71. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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In the 1960s, when an unenumerated “right of privacy,”
which is not an “express prohibition” in the Constitution,
was protected by the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, all
hell broke loose, even among those progressives who
rejected the legal prohibition of contraceptives.72
There is certainly language suggesting constitutional protection of liberty
in Griswold v. Connecticut,73 the case where the Supreme Court invalidated a
Connecticut statute criminalizing use and distribution of contraceptives as
unconstitutional for violating a fundamental privacy right. In Griswold, the
nine justices unanimously joined in Justice Douglas’s opinion of the Court.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan also joined in Justice Goldberg’s
concurring opinion, which stated that:
The protection guaranteed by the (Fourth and Fifth) amendments
is much broader in scope. The makers of our Constitution
undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness . . . . They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure
and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things . . . .
They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let
alone–the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.74
Justice Goldberg quoted the Ninth Amendment75 in his opinion, clearly
believing that it applied in Griswold.
He also quoted the Tenth
Amendment,76 James Madison,77 Alexander Hamilton,78 Justice Story,79 and
Bates v. Little Rock:
In a long series of cases this Court has held that where
fundamental liberties are involved, they may not be abridged by
the States simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some
rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose.
72. Presumption of Liberty, supra note 63, at 40.
73. 381 U.S. 479.
74. Id. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
75. Id. at 488.
76. Id. at 489 n.4.
77. Id. at 489–90.
78. Id. at 489 n.4.
79. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 490 (quoting COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 626–27 (5th ed. 1891)).
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“Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal
liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating
interest which is compelling.”80
The Ninth Amendment provides, “The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people.”81 The Tenth Amendment provides, “[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”82 Justice
Goldberg concluded, “[the] statements of Madison and Story make clear that
the Framers did not intend that the first eight amendments be construed to
exhaust the basic and fundamental rights which the Constitution guaranteed
to the people.”83
Justice Goldberg was aware that “[t]his [Ninth]
Amendment has been referred to as ‘The Forgotten Ninth Amendment,’ in a
book with that title by Bennett B. Patterson (1955).”84 Long after Griswold,
Professor Barnett also admitted that he had made a cottage industry out of his
attention to clauses seemingly lost from constitution, such as the Ninth
Amendment.85
Lawrence v. Texas,86 finding a Texas statute criminalizing same sex
sodomy unconstitutional, also offers some promising generalities about
protected liberties.87 In Lawrence, the Court noted that “[i]f the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 497 (quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 490 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Id. at 492 n.6.
Presumption of Liberty, supra note 63, at 31. Professor Barnett writes:
[S]ince 1988 I have been writing and thinking about the Ninth Amendment to the
Constitution, which says “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” I have to tell you what
it says because I have a suspicion that it may not be strongly emphasized in your
constitutional law classes. If you did not study the Ninth Amendment it is because the
Supreme Court has basically ignored it for most of its history, along with a number of
other clauses I discuss in my book, Restoring the Lost Constitution. The term “lost
constitution” in the title of my book refers to these clauses, like the Ninth Amendment,
that are read out of the Constitution and just aren’t there anymore as a practical matter.
No lawyer could litigate on the basis of the Ninth Amendment or using the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. These clauses are effectively redacted
from the text. Still, I started writing about the Ninth Amendment because it always
seemed like an interesting clause, and one that appealed to me ever since I was a law
student. I figured, “Well, now I had tenure,” so I should be able to write about any clause
that was still literally in the Constitution, even if it was considered to be beyond the pale
by scholars.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
86. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding unconstitutional a Texas statute that criminalized sodomy between
same-sex couples).
87. Id. at 578–79.
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fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.”88 In addition, the Lawrence Court quoted from Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey that “[o]ur obligation is to define the
liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”89 The Lawrence Court
went on to explain that “[t]he Casey decision again confirmed that our laws
and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education.”90 In further explanation, the Lawrence Court quoted the Casey
Court once again:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State.91
The Casey Court, which revisited Roe v. Wade some 20 years after its
decision that certain restrictions on abortion were unconstitutional, held that
the requirement that a woman notify her husband before an abortion was
similarly unconstitutional and further stated:
It is conventional constitutional doctrine that where
reasonable people disagree the government can adopt one
position or the other. That theorem, however, assumes a state of
affairs in which the choice does not intrude upon a protected
liberty. Thus, while some people might disagree about whether
or not the flag should be saluted, or disagree about the
proposition that it may not be defiled, we have ruled that a State
may not compel or enforce one view or the other.92
What might be said about all of these Supreme Court quotes about
liberty, in the context of the decision to uphold the individual mandate of
Obamacare, may best be captured by that which comedian Woody Allen is
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 565 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
Id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
Id. at 573–74 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
Id. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (internal citations omitted).
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reported to have said about baseball: “it doesn’t have to mean anything, it’s
just very beautiful . . . .”93 Quoting Mr. Allen may seem a bit harsh, but the
majority opinion in NFIB does not seem to recognize a constitutional liberty
interest either to be left alone or to make private personal decisions freely.
The language of the Supreme Court in decisions past raises an important
question. Why should decisions regarding contraception, appropriate types of
sexual conduct, private schooling, and saluting or defiling the flag enjoy
more protection than a decision about whether or not to purchase health
insurance? After all, such a decision is both economic and deeply personal,
affecting one’s right to conduct his or her own life and possibly its ending.
C. Constitutional Decision Making: Presumption of Liberty Versus
Presumption of Constitutionality
Professor Barnett has indicated that the Supreme Court’s formulation
requiring the finding of a fundamental right, implicit in ordered liberty or in
the history and traditions of the nation, can offer limited protection of liberty.
This is particularly true when the presumption is that federal or state
legislation is constitutional, as opposed to the presumption of liberty on
behalf of citizens.94 Professor Barnett explained the current state of
constitutional law after Carolene Products, the presumption of
constitutionality of legislation, Griswold, and the unenumerated right of
privacy as follows:
So the burden is now on the claimant litigating a Due
Process Clause challenge to say that an unenumerated liberty is
not just a mere “liberty interest,” which gets no judicial
protection, but is one of these heightened “fundamental rights”
that is either deeply rooted in the nation’s tradition and history or
is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty . . . . [B]ut see
Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Court did protect liberty without
finding, as a threshold matter, that the liberty in question was
deeply rooted in the nation’s tradition and history.95
Professor Barnett does have a suggestion:
My proposal is that all liberties should be treated equally.
Under my proposal, the government would have the burden to
93. Mr. Allen’s actual quote was, “I love baseball, you know it doesn’t have to mean anything, it’s just
very beautiful to watch.” See PETER H. GORDON, DIAMONDS ARE FOREVER: ARTISTS AND WRITERS ON
BASEBALL (Chronicle Books 1987) (citing the ZELIG (ORION PICTURES 1983)).
94. See generally Presumption of Liberty, supra note 63 (discussing the presumption of liberty versus
the presumption of constitutionality); see also Epstein, supra note 50, at 931.
95. Presumption of Liberty, supra note 63, at 41.
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justify its restrictions on liberty, whether exercising its police
power at the state level, or its enumerated powers at the federal
level. Whatever power is being exercised, the government may
justly (1) regulate the rightful exercise of liberty or (2) prohibit
wrongful acts, but they may not (3) prohibit rightful exercise of
liberty.96
Professor Barnett refers to the police power of the states in conjunction
with the enumerated powers of the federal government. Many may well
regard the federal government’s requirement that individuals purchase health
insurance, or pay a “tax,” as akin to the states’ power to require motorcycle
riders to wear a helmet.97 Of course, the federal government is supposed to
be one of limited and enumerated powers, so much so that Professor Barnett
thought that argument would prevail in NFIB: “I think there may well be
five votes for the proposition that economic mandates are simply not within
the limited and enumerated powers of Congress.”98 And, of course, Justice
Scalia emphasized that “there are structural limits upon federal power” and
that the Constitution “enumerates not federally soluble problems, but
federally available powers.”99
Professor Barnett is concerned about the apparent lack of protection for
liberty under current constitutional doctrine: “Distinguishing ‘fundamental
rights’ from mere ‘liberty interests’ and protecting only the former is bad for
liberty, bad for the public interest, and something that courts are not
particularly qualified or authorized to do.”100 Professor Barnett has
apparently been alternately hopeful and not so hopeful about protection for
liberty becoming greater.
For the Constitution says this: “The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.” And the Footnote Four
formulation, even if expanded to include those unenumerated
rights that courts deem to be “fundamental,” is a direct violation
of this expressed conjunction of the Constitution itself. Or so
those academics with tenure may contend. Perhaps someday,

96. Id. at 43.
97. See, e.g., City of Bremerton v. Spears, 134 Wn.2d 141 (1998) (considering the constitutionality of a
mandatory helmet law).
98. Joondeph, supra note 68, at 617 (article of Professor Randy Barnett).
99. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2643, 2650.
100. Presumption of Liberty, supra note 63, at 44.
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Article III judges with lifetime tenure will agree. Such a change
of heart would be, I maintain, in the public interest.101
Perhaps Article III judges searching for a way to afford additional
protection to liberty might utilize cases such as Speiser and Citizens United
as suggested above. Indeed, the formulation in those cases is that a benefit
may not be conditioned on the nonexercise of a constitutional right.102
Applying that type of reasoning to Obamacare as addressed in NFIB, the
Court could find that the benefit of not having to pay the tax of the individual
mandate might well be conditioned upon the nonexercise of a constitutional
right. The constitutional right not exercised would be an unenumerated
liberty right in the Constitution to be left alone, as suggested in Griswold,
and/or to make decisions about one’s personal affairs, as suggested in
Casey.103
Of course, in Speiser and Citizens United, the constitutional right that
was not exercised or burdened was free speech under the First Amendment.
Professor Barnett also utilizes the First Amendment cases, although
admittedly reaching them by a different route.
Consider how we now approach the liberties protected by the
First Amendment—the rights of freedom of speech, press, and
assembly. When it comes to these liberties we allow them to be
reasonably regulated by so-called time, place, and manner
regulations . . . . Therefore, the reasonable regulation of these
liberties is constitutionally permissible, provided that the
government is not improperly placing an undue burden on the
exercise of liberty or discriminating against one viewpoint in
favor of another.
....
Just as the government now prohibits wrongful speech and
regulates rightful speech, I propose simply that we take that
same approach across the board with all liberties. No longer
would we protect only those liberties that are somehow
“fundamental.”104
Professor Barnett’s language of “not improperly placing undue burden on the
exercise of liberty” may remind one of the “undue burden” language used in
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 44–45 (footnote omitted).
See supra notes 48–59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 60–92 and accompanying text.
Presumption of Liberty, supra note 63, at 44.
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Casey, when the Supreme Court revisited Roe v. Wade some twenty years
later.
In fact, there are pending challenges to Obamacare based on arguments
under current constitutional interpretations. Such challenges would be that
fundamental rights have suffered an undue burden so that the government
must show a compelling interest for the legislation (as stated in Justice
Goldberg’s concurring opinion in Griswold).105 For example, Liberty
University v. Geithner106 has made an argument that the fundamental right of
freedom of religion under the First Amendment is burdened by Obamacare.
Professor Barnett has also attempted to use what he calls “anticommandeering” to similarly preserve liberty.107 Professor Barnett has
reasoned to the anti-commandeering principle from Justice Scalia’s opinion
in Printz v. United States.108 “In Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that this mandate [requiring local sheriffs to run background checks on
the purchasers of firearms] on state executives unconstitutionally violated the
Tenth Amendment and the sovereignty of state governments.” 109 Professor
Barnett also compared that commandeering of the state governments to the
commandeering of individuals. “Just as commandeering state governments
is an unconstitutional infringement of state sovereignty, commandeering the
people violates the even more fundamental principle of popular
sovereignty.”110
Finally, Professor Barnett closes his anti-commandeering argument by
stating that to allow such commandeering would turn citizens into subjects.
The anti-commandeering principle precisely identifies why
the individual mandate has so riled the American people.
Ordinarily, persons are responsible for their failure to act—or
omissions—when they have a preexisting duty to act. A
mandate to act, therefore, presupposes the existence of a duty.
But unlike the type of preexisting fundamental duties that have
105. See supra notes 72–80 and accompanying text.
106. See 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010), vacated, No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Sept.
8, 2011); see also Mark Sherman, Supreme Court Orders Federal Appeals Court to Consider Health Care
Challenge,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Nov.
26,
2012,
1:04
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/26/supreme-court-health-care_n_2191463.html
(discussing
Liberty).
107. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance
Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581 (2010) [hereinafter Commandeering the
People] (arguing that the anti-commandeering doctrine ought to extend not only to states but also to
individuals); see also Joondeph, supra note 68, at 617.
108. See 521 U.S. 898, 904–05 (1997) (commandeering of local law enforcement officers); see also
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (commandeering of state legislature).
109. Joondeph, supra note 68, at 616 (article of Professor Randy Barnett) (footnotes omitted).
110. Id. at 617.
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traditionally been recognized, such as the duties to defend one’s
country and provide the revenue needed to maintain its
governance, there is no fundamental duty of citizenship to enter
into contracts with private parties when Congress deems it
convenient to the regulation of interstate commerce. Upholding
such mandates would truly turn citizens into subjects.111
One may wonder why it has come to this seemingly difficult task to
protect liberty in a society whose foundational documents, the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution, found liberty to be so essential.112 After
all, at the risk of seeming facetious, noted American patriot Patrick Henry
did not proclaim, “Give me health insurance or give me death!”113
The next section of this paper considers the current dilemma of
protecting liberty by seeking to understand, at least to some degree, the
constitutional philosophy of the president whose name is immortalized in
Obamacare, the term utilized to refer to the law under scrutiny in NFIB.
V. THE CONSTITUTION AS A CHARTER OF NEGATIVE LIBERTIES
Perhaps it would be instructive in seeking to further the protection of
liberty under constitutional doctrine to examine at least two currently
prevalent doctrines of constitutionalism. It is likely that many Americans
first heard of negative constitutionalism and the U.S. Constitution described
as a “charter of negative liberties” when a 2001 radio interview with Barack
Obama was unearthed during the 2008 presidential campaign. Back on
January 18, 2001, State Senator Barack Obama appeared on WBEZ-FM’s
show “Odyssey” to discuss the topic “The Courts and Civil Rights.” When
State Senator Obama described the U.S. Constitution as a “charter of
negative liberties,” he was criticizing the Warren Court, usually regarded as
quite liberal, for not being radical enough.
He stated:
But . . . the Supreme Court never ventured into the issues of
redistribution of wealth and sort of more basic issues of political
and economic justice in this society. And to that extent, as
111. Commandeering the People, supra note 107, at 637.
112. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
113. See WILLIAM WIRT, SKETCHES OF THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF PATRICK HENRY 94 (1817)
(quoting Patrick Henry, Speech at the House of Burgesses at St. John’s Church in Richmond, Virginia
(Mar. 23, 1775) (transcript available at http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Patrick_Henry)). The crowd, by
Wirt's account, jumped up and shouted “To Arms! To Arms!” in response to Patrick Henry’s famous line,
“Give me liberty, or give me death!” The author of this article was reminded of the unwavering belief in
liberty of many of the Founders while in a weekend Revolutionary War re-enactment with his then tenyear-old son at a school outing at Riley’s Farm in Oak Glen, California. The family patriarch delivered
Henry’s speech. Visit Riley’s Farm online at www.rileysfarm.com.
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radical as I think people tried to characterize the Warren Court, it
wasn’t that radical. It didn’t break free from the essential
constraints that were placed by the founding fathers in the
Constitution, at least as it’s been interpreted, and [the] Warren
Court interpreted in the same way that, generally, the
Constitution is a charter of negative liberties, says what the states
can’t do to you, says what the federal government can’t do to
you, but it doesn’t say what the federal government or the state
government must do on your behalf. And that hasn’t shifted.114
Justice Elena Kagan, one of President Barack Obama’s appointments to
the Supreme Court, wrote perhaps more directly than President Obama, as a
Supreme Court law clerk for Justice Thurgood Marshall in 1987 on the
theories of negative and positive constitutionalism: “I only worry that a
majority of this court will agree with [Seventh Circuit] Judge Posner and that
‘the Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties’ and
will thereby preclude the approach of the Third and Fourth circuits.”115
Justice Kagan wrote her memo to Justice Marshall in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County,116 a case that may be an example of the old legal saying
that hard cases make bad law. In that case:
The court’s 6-3 ruling immunized state welfare officials who
over the course of a year failed to act when repeatedly alerted to
an alcoholic father’s violent abuse of his four-year-old son. The
continued beatings ultimately put the boy in a coma, destroyed
half his brain and left him institutionalized for life, court records
say.117
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit had held that state officials had
no duty to protect the son, Joshua DeShaney, and U.S. Supreme Court Chief
Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the majority, said the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended “to protect the people
from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each
other.”118

114. Jake Tapper, McCain to Attack Obama for Public Radio Comments from 2001, ABC NEWS (Oct.
27, 2008, 10:16 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2008/10/McCain-to-attac/.
115. Jess Bravin, Kagan Backed Broad Interpretation of 14th Amendment, WALL ST. J. (May 16, 2010,
9:44 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703745904575248620872377444.html.
116. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
117. Bravin, supra note 115.
118. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196.
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A recent Wall Street Journal article reporting on DeShaney and Kagan,
however, has cited a discussion of legal scholars concerning the revitalization
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Some liberals have argued that it would be wiser to ground
claims like DeShaney’s in another 14th Amendment clause,
which bars states from abridging “the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States.” Since the late 19th century, the
Supreme Court has given little significance to the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. But scholars across the political spectrum
believe that reading is mistaken, and say its diminished status
has resulted in limiting rights the framers intended citizens to
exercise.119
The article further quotes David Gans of the liberal Constitution
Accountability Center as stating that the “right of protection” that the court
rejected in DeShaney was “unquestionably one of the Privileges or
Immunities that the framers of the [Fourteenth] Amendment considered a
fundamental right of all citizens.”120 Professor Randy Barnett, presumably
on the end of the political spectrum opposite Gans, would likely also argue
for using the Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect liberty.121
Thus, the DeShaney case has legal scholars, probably at the outer edges
of each end of the political spectrum, reaching for protection of the plaintiff
but in potentially different ways, unless the two sides converge on the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. Certainly, President Obama’s criticism of
reading the U.S. Constitution as a charter of negative liberties is likely far
removed from the views of James Madison, Justice Scalia, Justice Goldberg,
and Professor Barnett concerning the federal government as a government of
enumerated powers.122 Even a positive constitutionalist like Sotirios A.
Barber, in a response to Randy E. Barnett, has identified James Madison as
likely espousing negative constitutionalism.123
Presumably, President
Obama’s constitutional view would be closer to Justice Kagan’s.
Given that President Obama gave the nation the individual mandate
through medical legislation dubbed “Obamacare,” it might be instructive to
inquire into his own constitutional theories that might underlie such
legislation. In fact, President Obama had spent twelve years at the
University of Chicago Law School as a lecturer teaching three classes in
constitutional law which included due process and equal protection, voting
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Bravin, supra note 115.
Id.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 64–80 and accompanying text.
Sotirios A. Barber, Fallacies of Negative Constitutionalism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 651, 666 (2006).
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rights, and racism and the law.124 But, as has been observed of President
Obama, “his views [could not] be gleaned from scholarship; Mr. Obama has
never published any.”125 On the other hand, President Obama did use a
fellowship that the same law school gave him to write Dreams from My
Father.126 Again, perhaps, examination of that record might help to
illuminate President Obama’s constitutional theories and explain the
country’s journey to the point where defense of liberties seems to have
become more and more difficult.
Dinesh D’Souza127 has apparently attempted just that task in recent
Forbes Magazine article How Obama Thinks,128 a feature film called 2016:
Obama’s America,129 and a book titled The Roots of Obama’s Rage.130
Although Mr. D’Souza, an academic, has reached out to and through the
popular media, his may be one of the only attempts to date to understand the
political, and thus constitutional, philosophy that President Obama
apparently received from his father.
Mr. D’Souza’s thesis is that President Obama’s worldview is one that is
foreign to most Americans.131 “To most Americans,” he states, “anticolonialism is an unfamiliar idea, so let me explain it.”132 Both Justice Scalia
dissenting in NFIB and a Wall Street Journal article commenting on that case
utilized the often cited American historical narrative framework that this
country was born out of an anti-tax revolution.133 Justice Scalia wrote:
Taxes have never been popular, see, e.g., Stamp Act of 1765,
and in part for that reason, the Constitution requires tax increases
to originate in the House of Representatives . . . . We have no
doubt that Congress knew precisely what it was doing when it
124. Jodi Kantor, Teaching Law, Testing Ideas, Obama Stood Slightly Apart, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2008,
at A1.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Dinesh D’Souza is President of King’s College and a Fellow at times at the Hoover Institute at
Stanford University and the American Enterprise Institute.
128. Dinesh D’Souza, How Obama Thinks, FORBES MAG. (Sept. 9, 2010, 5:40 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0927/politics-socialism-capitalism-private-enterprises-obamabusiness-problem.html [hereinafter How Obama Thinks].
129. 2016: OBAMA’S AMERICA (OAF LLC 2012).
130. DINESH D’SOUZA, THE ROOTS OF OBAMA’S RAGE (2010).
131. How Obama Thinks, supra note 128.
132. Id. A native of Mumbai, India, D’Souza knows a great deal about anticolonialism. He states, “I
am part of the first Indian generation to be born after my country’s independence from the British.
Anticolonialism was the rallying cry of Third World politics for much of the second half of the 20th
century.” Id.
133. See Joe Rago, A Vast New Taxing Power, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2012, 8:12 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303561504577496603068605864.html [hereinafter Vast
New Taxing Power].
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rejected an earlier version of this legislation that imposed a tax
instead of a requirement-with-penalty . . . . Imposing a tax
through judicial legislation inverts the constitutional scheme, and
places the power to tax in the branch of government least
accountable to the citizenry.134
Similarly, the Wall Street Journal, commenting upon the opinion, wrote as
follows:
America has its origins in a rebellion against arbitrary and
pernicious taxation and the Framers wanted to make it extremely
difficult to impose or raise direct taxes. These can easily morph
into plenary police powers, the regulation of private behavior
and conduct that the Constitution vests in the states. For this
reason, while the taxing power in addition to raising revenue can
achieve regulatory results, those regulatory results must be
constitutional themselves.135
Apparently, Mr. D’Souza believes that President Obama’s formative
experience regarding governmental power was quite different. Mr. D’Souza
points out that President Obama spent his first seventeen years off the
American mainland, in Hawaii, Indonesia, and Pakistan (with visits to
Africa), that he has denied that he believes in American exceptionalism, and
that he wrote the aforementioned book, Dreams from My Father.136
Of President Obama’s father, Barack Obama, Sr., Mr. D’Souza writes:
He was a Luo tribesman who grew up in Kenya and studied at
Harvard. He was a polygamist . . . . He was also a regular drunk
driver . . . causing his own legs to be amputated due to
injury . . . . In 1982 he got drunk at a bar in Nairobi and drove
into a tree, killing himself.137
However, Mr. D’Souza also says, “Obama Sr. was an economist, and in
1965 he published an important article in the East Africa Journal called
‘Problems Facing Our Socialism.’”138 Mr. D’Souza explains, “Obama Sr.
wasn’t a doctrinaire socialist; rather, he saw state appropriation of wealth as a

134. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2655 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. Vast New Taxing Power, supra note 133.
136. How Obama Thinks, supra note 128 (information derived from BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM
MY FATHER: A STORY OF RACE AND INHERITANCE (2d ed. 2004)).
137. Id.
138. Id.
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necessary means to achieve the anticolonial objective of taking resources
away from the foreign looters and restoring them to the people of Africa.”139
On taxes, the subject of this paper, Mr. D’Souza wrote the following of
President Obama’s father:
The senior Obama proposed that the state confiscate private land
and raise taxes with no upper limit. In fact, he insisted that
“theoretically, there is nothing that can stop the government from
taxing 100% of income so long as the people get benefits from
the government commensurate with their income which is
taxed.”140
Mr. D’Souza continues in his analysis of Mr. Obama’s political and
cultural background:
Today’s neocolonial leader is not Europe but America. As the
late Palestinian scholar Edward Said—who was one of Obama’s
teachers at Columbia University—wrote in Culture and
Imperialism, “The United States has replaced the earlier great
empires and is the dominant outside force.”
....
It may seem incredible to suggest that the anticolonial ideology
of Barack Obama Sr. is espoused by his son, the President of the
United States.
....
Colonialism today is a dead issue. No one cares about it except
the man in the White House. He is the last anticolonial.
Emerging market economies such as China, India, Chile and
Indonesia have solved the problem of backwardness . . . .
. . . [O]ur President is trapped in his father’s time machine . . . .
The invisible father provides inspiration and the son dutifully
gets the job done. America today is governed by a ghost.141

139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting Barak H. Obama, Problems Facing Our Socialism, E. AFR. J. 26, 31 (July 1965)).
141. Id.
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Even allowing for some political hyperbole in Mr. D’Souza’s
assessment, he does offer several examples of the President’s “anticolonial
ideology.” Specifically, Mr. D’Souza cites the President’s: (1) support for
oil drilling off the coast of Brazil but not in America; (2) reduction of
America’s carbon consumption; subsidizing energy production in the
developing world; (3) refusal to nationalize investment banks and the health
sector but instead bringing them under the government’s leash (primarily by
refusing bail out paybacks to financial institutions and by imposing
Obamacare); (4) having the rich pay close to fifty percent or more of their
income in overall taxes; (5) failing to object to Britain’s release of Lockerbie
bomber Abdel Baset al-Megrahi to his home country; and (6) NASA’s role
as a public relations program outreach to Muslim countries.142 Of all the
analysis, Mr. D’Souza’s observations about President Obama’s relation to the
health industry may be most informative and apropos to this analysis:
For Obama, health insurance companies on their own are
oppressive racketeers, but once they submitted to federal
oversight he was happy to do business with them. He even
promised them expanded business as a result of his law forcing
every American to buy health insurance.143
This statement may well explain the President’s political outlook on the
constitutionality of the individual mandate. Mr. D’Souza’s explanation of
President Obama as an antineocolonialist appears to be in accord with the
President’s own criticism of the constitution as a charter of negative liberties.
Certainly, a neocolonialist view would appear more in accord with the
positive constitutionalism expressed by President Obama (and Justice
Kagan).
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether or not Mr. D’Souza is correct about the source of President
Obama’s outlook on constitutional government in the United States, it seems
clear that the view of President Obama, his former solicitor general, and now
Supreme Court appointee, Elena Kagan, is quite different from that of James
Madison, Justice Scalia, Justice Goldberg, academicians like Professor
Barnett, and even the Warren Court. Sadly to this author and likely to the
traditional American narrative, though, this view may not be so different
from that of the American people. Presently, the re-election of President
Obama continues the implementation of the individual mandate and may
142. How Obama Thinks, supra note 128.
143. Id.
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signify that a majority of the American people, at least in some states and
cities, prefer the offer of security to liberty. Founding father Benjamin
Franklin has been credited with the quote, “They who can give up essential
liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor
safety.”144 Similarly, to paraphrase former British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher, described as a “soul mate” of President Ronald Reagan145 and
credited with musings that socialism is great until you run out of other
people’s money,146 the end of the United States could well be when we run
out of liberty. Some have likely said of President Reagan that his mantra was
lower taxes, less government, more personal freedom.147
Recent
constitutional tax cases such as NFIB and events like the re-election of

144. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 270 (1818).
145. See, e.g., Archived Papers Reveal Thatcher Secrets, BBC NEWS (Mar. 17, 2012, 1:06 AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17369334.
146. Todd Ganos, Why Socialism Doesn’t Work, FORBES MAG. (Feb. 17, 2012, 9:40 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/toddganos/2012/02/17/why-socialism-doesnt-work/.
147. See,
e.g.,
www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/Reagandomestic/?flavor=mobile

.
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President Obama certainly depart from Reagan’s formula. To value liberty,
likely a different course must be taken from the present one.148

148. President Reagan gave hope to the then-younger generation—the “Baby Boomers”—that they
could enjoy the same prosperity and freedom of their parents despite what has often been called the
“economic malaise” of the Carter years. See Neil Munro, Obama Echoes Carter’s ‘Malaise’: U.S. Has
‘Gotten a Little Soft’, DAILY CALLER (Sept. 30, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/obama-echoes-cartermalaise-u-gotten-little-soft-135010839.html (comparing a controversial Obama speech with Carter’s
“malaise speech”). For example, among his many quotable phrases, Reagan spoke of America as the
“shining city on the hill” and his re-election slogan was “It’s Morning Again in America.” See Ronald
Reagan, Remarks Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention (Aug.
23, 1984) (transcript available in the University of Texas archives) (“shining city on the hill”); Top 10
Campaign
Ads,
TIME
MAG.
(Sept.
22,
2008),
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1842516_1842514_1842575,00.html (“It’s
Morning Again in America”); see also Philip Klein, Reagan’s ‘Morning in America’ vs. Obama’s
America, WASH. EXAM’R (Oct. 19, 2012, 12:32 PM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/reagans-morningin-america-vs.-obamas-america/article/2511223. President Obama campaigned famously in his first
presidential campaign on the slogan of “Hope and Change.” But see Chad Stafko, How’s That Hope and
Change Working Out for Obama Supporters?, AM. THINKER (June 14, 2011),
http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/06/hows_that_hope_and_change_working_out_for_obama_suppor
ters.html (discussing Obama’s failure to live up to that slogan); Jim Kuhnhenn, Obama 2012 Reelection
Campaign: ‘Hope’ and ‘Change’ Aren’t Enough to Inspire Voters, HUFFINGTON POST (June 15, 2011,
3:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/15/obama-2012-election-campaign_n_877258.html.
Of his second campaign, President Obama said “[i]t’s still about hope. It’s still about change.” See
Obama: 2012 Campaign Still About ‘Hope’ and ‘Change’, FOX NEWS (May 6, 2012),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/05/06/obama-2012-campaign-still-about-hope-and-change/.
Apparently, the generation now younger than the “baby boomers” is embracing a different kind of hope.
See Exit Polls Anatomise Obama Win, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2012, 2:20 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-20240375. “Millennials”—those born after 1980—were the
only generation to indicate by more than 50% that “Government should do more to solve problems” in a
survey by Pew Research Center. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MILLENNIALS PORTRAIT OF GENERATION
NEXT 63 (2010), http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/millennials-confident-connected-open-tochange.pdf. Similarly, the Millennials indicate at barely 40% that “[w]hen Something Is Run by the
Government, It Is Usually Inefficient and Wasteful” while the other generations surveyed (“Silent,” “Baby
Boomer,” and “Generation X”) agree with the statement (62%, 66%, 55%). Id. at 71. The generations are
categorized by Pew Research Center as Silent (born 1928–1945), Baby Boomer (born 1946–1964),
Generation X (born 1965–1980), and Greatest Generation (born before 1928). Id. at 4. Concerning the
“Greatest Generation,” the Pew Research Report states as follows: “The Greatest Generation (those born
before1928) saved the world when it was young, in the memorable phrase of Ronald Reagan. It’s the
generation that fought and won World War II.” Id. at 4. “We do not have enough respondents ages 83
and older in our 2010 survey to permit an analysis of the Greatest Generation . . . . Throughout much of
this report, we have grouped these older respondents in with the Silent generation. However, Chapter 8 on
politics and Chapter 9 on religion each draw on long-term trend data from other sources, permitting us in
some instances in those chapters to present findings about the Greatest Generation.” Id. at n.4.

